



Some observations on the plumbing.
April 11th, 2012







Objectives:

1. In a financed financial system, collateral is money
2. EMU: it's over



1. In a financed financial system, collateral is money



Velocity of collateral:

the number of times a financial instrument received as collateral can be sold, or repledged



Large banks and dealers use and reuse collateral pledged by nonbanks, which helps lubricate the global financial system




Figure 11: Securities pledged to Morgan Stanley that were available to be repledged to third parties. Data source: Aitken and Singh (2009), from SEC filings. Figure source: Duffie (2010).



Post Lehman, there has been a significant decline in the source of collateral for the large dealers that specialise in intermediating pledgeable collateral



The overall effect may have been a \$4-5 trillion reduction in high-grade collateral circulating in the US financial system



This decline in financial lubrication likely has an impact on the conduct of global monetary policy



...but remember 'subprime is contained?'

Why?



New classical, new Keynesian, DSGE models: the crisis was not supposed to happen.

Indeed, it could not happen.



These models rule out extended economic disequilibria by assumption..



....and pay little if any attention to the factors now commonly believed to have both precipitated the crisis and to have contributed to its longevity



Worse, recent regulations aimed at financial stability, focussing on building equity and liquidity buffers, reducing leverage, and segregation of margin will also reduce financial lubrication between banks and nonbanks



From 2011 10-Ks:

‘Fair value of financial instruments received as collateral that can be sold, or repledged’



Morgan Stanley: \$488 billion, of which \$335 billion sold or repledged (69%)

Goldman Sachs: \$622 billion, of which \$454 billion sold or repledged (73%)



JPMorgan: \$742.1 billion, of which '\$515.8 billion [69%] was sold or repledged, generally as collateral under repurchase agreements, securities lending agreements or to cover short sales and to collateralize deposits and derivative agreements'



Keynes:

Precautionary demand for cash balances, defined as those being held for fear of not being able to meet future obligations



Lessons from AIG & Lehman:

- 1) for banks: you will need more collateral than you think
- 2) for investors: keep that collateral in a segregated account



In a financed financial system, collateral is money.



3. EMU: it's over.



Verdun
22 September, 1984





Schuman Declaration



Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity



The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.



The convergence criteria within The Maastricht Treaty were designed to ensure that a Member State's economy was sufficiently prepared for the adoption of the single currency.



They provided a common baseline indicator of the stability, soundness and sustainability of Member State public finances that reflected economic policy convergence and a resilience to economic shocks..



The signatories gambled was that you could create a monetary union before you created a political union, and by the time the inevitable crisis arrived, you would have the institutional infrastructure to deal with it



What's the problem?

A consensus is emerging – better late than never
– that the euro zone crisis is also at its root a pure
balance-of-payments crisis...



..in which a number of key peripheral countries with current account deficits are struggling to fund themselves at the right price..

....and in which austerity is only just beginning.

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
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Please be careful to distinguish between austerity measures *passed*, and austerity measures *implemented*





How did EMU run out of eligible collateral?

Where did that Euro 14 trillion of eligible collateral go?



Answer: nowhere, and that is the problem





Genius of Draghi's LTROs?

For the first time in over two years, European banks had liability stability.



Liability stability:

- * no rollover risk
- * no involuntary deleveraging
- * ability to take ECB money and (for example) buy back debt at a discount
- * capital constructive rather than capital destructive



Downside?

Correlations increased as MFIs increase exposure to the same credits that got them into such trouble in the first place...




...at a time when austerity is only just beginning.



Bigger firewalls?

OR

Creating the right incentives for buy-and-hold credit and fixed income investors to return to peripheral European credits with confidence?



Subordination risk?



What can the ECB do:

- * cut rates?
- * further loose collateral guidelines?
- * ~~(trash talk the euro)~~



..nothing to stop ECB cutting below 1.0%, which would increase the positive carry of the ECB's LTROs



How about loosening collateral guidelines even further?



***The looser the collateral guidelines, the bigger the haircut,
the less the bang for the ECB's buck.***



New collateral guidelines = credit risk absorbed by national central banks



Balkanisation of collateral guidelines across EMU = credit
nationalism



What should you do?



If you think, like me, EMU is slowly and occasionally rapidly disintegrating before your eyes then the question you should be asking yourself every day is this:



‘How do I reduce my gross exposure to European credits and European banks to zero?’

In the absence of adequate hedges, the answer is ‘never take the exposure in the first place’.



Thank you for your attention.